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Abstract
The so-called paradoxes of material implication have motivated the development of many non-
classical logics over the years [2–5, 11]. In this note, we investigate some of these paradoxes and
classify them, over minimal logic. We provide proofs of equivalence and semantic models separating
the paradoxes where appropriate. A number of equivalent groups arise, all of which collapse with
unrestricted use of double negation elimination. Interestingly, the principle ex falso quodlibet, and
several weaker principles, turn out to be distinguishable, giving perhaps supporting motivation for
adopting minimal logic as the ambient logic for reasoning in the possible presence of inconsistency.
Keywords: reverse mathematics; minimal logic; ex falso quodlibet; implication; paraconsistent
logic; Peirce’s principle.
1 Introduction
The project of constructive reverse mathematics [6] has given rise to a wide literature where various the-
orems of mathematics and principles of logic have been classified over intuitionistic logic. What is less
well-known is that the subtle difference that arises when the principle of explosion, ex falso quodlibet,
is dropped from intuitionistic logic (thus giving (Johansson’s) minimal logic) enables the distinction of
many more principles. The focus of the present paper are a range of principles known collectively (but
not exhaustively) as the paradoxes of material implication; paradoxes because they illustrate that the
usual interpretation of formal statements of the form “. . . → . . .” as informal statements of the form
“if. . . then. . . ” produces counter-intuitive results.
Some of these principles were hinted at in [9]. Here we present a carefully worked-out chart,
classifying a number of such principles over minimal logic. These principles hold classically, and
intuitionistically either hold or are equivalent to one of three well-known principles (see Section 6).
As it turns out, over minimal logic these principles divide cleanly into a small number of distinct
categories. We hasten to add that the principles we classify here are considered as formula schemas,
and not individual instances. For example, when we write the formula ¬¬ϕ → ϕ for double negation
elimination (DNE), we mean that this should apply to all well-formed formulae ϕ. The work presented
here is thus not a narrowly-focused investigation of what-instance-implies-what-instance, but rather a
broad-stroke painting that classifies formula schemas as a whole.
This paper may be received in two ways: straightforwardly, as a contribution to reverse mathematics
over non-classical logics; or more subtly as providing some insight into the kinds of distinctions that
a good paraconsistent logic might contribute. Highlights of the paper include many refinements over
[14, chapter 6].
In what follows, we take: → to be minimal implication; ⊥ a logical constant not further defined
(with the usual identification of ¬α with α→ ⊥ for any well-formed formula α); ⊤ a logical constant
interchangeable with α→ α for some (arbitrary) well-formed formula α (that is,⊤ is always satisfied).
We will be interested in propositional axiom schemas, and instances of such schemas. A (proposi-
tional) axiom schema is any well-formed formula, where the propositional variables are interpreted as
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ranging over well-formed formulas. An instance of a formula schema is the schema with well-formed
formulae consistently substituting for propositional variables in the schema in the intuitively obvious
way. For example, the well-formed formula
¬(α ∧ β)→ (α ∧ β → ¬γ)
is an instance of the formula schema
¬ϕ→ (ϕ→ ψ)
(5 in what follows), where ϕ is replaced with α ∧ β, and ψ is replaced with ¬γ. We also say that
formula schema Φ implies formula schema Ψ if, given any instance ψ of Ψ, there are finitely many
instances {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn} of Φ such that
ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn =⇒ ψ,
where ⇒ is understood as the (meta-theoretic) minimal logic consequence relation. We also say that
Φ and Ψ are equivalent if both Φ implies Ψ and vice versa. Often it is theoretically useful to distin-
guish instance-wise implication from schematic implication [7], which is why we restrict ourselves to
instance-wise proofs.
2 Paradoxes of material implication
The paradoxes we classify are the following schemas. Where ϕ,ψ, β, ϑ are any well-formed formulas,
1. (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϑ) (linearity, strong form)
2. (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)→ ψ (ex contradictione quodlibet; the paradox of entailment)
3. ϕ→ (ψ ∨ ¬ψ)
4. (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ ¬ψ
5. ¬ϕ→ (ϕ→ ψ)
6. (¬ϕ→ ϕ)→ ϕ (consequentia mirabilis; Clavius’s law)1
7. ((ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϑ)→ ((ϕ→ ϑ) ∨ (ψ → ϑ))
8. ((ϕ→ ϑ) ∧ (ψ → β))→ ((ϕ→ β) ∨ (ψ → ϑ))
9. (¬(ϕ→ ψ))→ (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) (the counterexample principle)
10. (((ϕ→ ψ)→ ϕ)→ ϕ) (Peirce’s Principle (PP))
11. (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ) (Dirk Gently’s Principle2 (DGP))
12. (¬¬ϕ ∨ ϕ)→ ϕ3
13. ψ ∨ (ψ → ϑ) (Tarski’s formula)
14. (¬ϕ→ ¬ψ) ∨ (¬ψ → ¬ϕ) (weak Dirk Gently’s Principle)
15. (ϕ→ ψ ∨ ϑ)→ ((ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ϕ→ ϑ))
16. ¬(ϕ→ ¬ϕ)→ ϕ (a form of Aristotle’s law4)
1The version (ϕ → ¬ϕ) → ¬ϕ is used in [12]. However, since ex falso quodlibet falsum (⊥ → ¬φ) holds in minimal logic,
that version is provable over minimal logic. This suggests that while the present work illustrates many distinctions, there are still
more distinctions that are not apparent here.
2Our name for this is based on the guiding principle of the protagonist of Douglas Adam’s novel Dirk Gently’s Holistic Detective
Agency [1] who believes in the “fundamental interconnectedness of all things.” It also appears as an axiom in Go¨del–Dummett logic,
and is more commonly known as (weak) linearity.
3The Wikipedia page at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consequentia_mirabilis actually lists this as
equivalent to 6, however that is not quite correct as we can see below. If we add the assumption that ϕ → ψ ≡ ¬ϕ ∨ ψ,
then they do turn out to be equivalent. However that statement—interpreting → as material implication—is minimally at least as
strong as LEM.
4Connexive logics are closely related. There, instead, the antecedent is taken as axiom schema; thus connexive logics are entirely
non-classical, since ¬(ϕ→ ¬ϕ) is not classical valid.
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Strictly speaking, these are of course axiom schemes rather then single axioms. These sentences are
all classical theorems, where the arrow→ is interpreted as material implication.5 Initially, we are inter-
ested how these principles relate to the following basic logical principles, the universal applicability of
which is well-known to be rejected by intuitionistic (or, in the third case, minimal) logic:
DNE ¬¬ϕ→ ϕ (double negation elimination)
LEM ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ (law of excluded middle)
EFQ ⊥ → ϕ (ex falso quodlibet)6
WLEM ¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ (weak law of excluded middle)7
It will turn out that there are two further important distinguishable classes; those related to Peirce’s
Principle, and those related to Dirk Gently’s Principle.
We will also consider the following versions of De Morgan’s laws
DM1 ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ
DM2 ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ
DM1′ ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)↔ ϕ ∨ ψ
DM2′ ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)↔ ϕ ∧ ψ
Notice that DM2 can be proven in minimal logic.
3 Equivalents
Proposition 1. The following are equivalent:
a) DNE, 9, 12, 16, DM1′, and DM2′;
b) LEM, 3, 4, and 6;
c) EFQ, 2, and 5;
d) WLEM, 14, and DM1
Proof. a) Clearly DNE ⇔ 12 and DNE ⇔ 16. To see that DNE ⇒ 9, assume DNE and suppose
that
¬(ϕ→ ψ). (1)
Suppose also, for contradiction, that
¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ). (2)
Suppose further that ϕ and ¬ψ. Adjunction then gives ϕ ∧ ¬ψ, contradicting (2); and so ¬¬ψ
(discharging the assumption ¬ψ). DNE yields ψ, whence ϕ → ψ (discharging ϕ). This contra-
dicts (1), and so ¬¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ). Another application of DNE yields 9.
For the converse, suppose ¬¬ϕ; that is, ¬(ϕ→ ⊥). Then by 9, ϕ ∧ ¬⊥. Hence, ϕ.
Clearly DNE implies both versions of De Morgan’s laws. Conversely we see that for ψ = ϕ they
both reduce to DNE.
b) LEM ⇔ 3, LEM ⇔ 4 and LEM ⇒ 6 are straightforward.8 To see that 6 ⇒ LEM, it is enough
to show that ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) → ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. So assume ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ). Then ϕ leads to a contradiction,
whence ¬ϕ holds. This can be weakened to ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ and we are done.
c) Clearly, EFQ ⇒ 2 ⇒ 5. To see that 5 ⇒ EFQ, note that from ⊥ we may deduce ⊤ → ⊥ by
weakening; that is, ¬⊤. Applying 5, ⊤ → ϕ, whence ϕ. The deduction theorem then yields
EFQ.
5Since all of these axioms are not provable in minimal logic, deducing them in classical logic is not mechanic and they are
therefore good exercises for students.
6Of course this is intuitionistically provable/definitional.
7An axiom in Jankov’s logic, and De Morgan logic.
8With judicious substitutions—in particular, using ϕ ≡ ⊤ in the right-to-left implications.
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d) First we show WLEM ⇔ 14. We have that either ¬ψ or ¬¬ψ holds. In the first case we also
have ¬ϕ → ¬ψ. In the second case assume that ¬ψ holds. So we have ⊥, which gives ¬ϕ by
weakening.
Conversely we either have ¬ϕ→ ¬¬ϕ or ¬¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ. In the first case the assumption that ¬ϕ
holds leads to ⊥, and hence ¬¬ϕ. In the second case, assuming ϕ, we get ¬¬ϕ and thus ¬ϕ,
which gives ⊥ by detachment; therefore, ¬ϕ.
Next we show WLEM ⇔ DM1. Assume DM1 and let ϕ be arbitrary. Since ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ϕ) is
provable in intuitionistic logic we have ¬¬ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ; that is WLEM holds.
Conversely assume that ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ). By WLEM either ¬ϕ or ¬¬ϕ. It is easy to see that in the
second case the assumption that ψ holds leads to a contradiction. Hence ¬ψ and we are done.
Next, we single out Peirce’s Principle (10, PP), and Dirk Gently’s Principle (11, DGP). As will be
shown in the next section, these principles are strictly distinguishable from the others.
Proposition 2. The following are equivalent:
(a) PP, 1, and 13;
(b) DGP, 7, 8, and 15.
Proof. (a) We show 1⇒ PP ⇒ 13⇒ 1.
First, consider ϕ, and ψ such that (ϕ → ψ) → ϕ. By 1 either ⊤ → ϕ or ϕ → ψ. In the first
case ϕ holds. In the second case we can use the assumption to show that, also, ϕ holds. Together
((ϕ→ ψ)→ ϕ)→ ϕ
so that PP holds.
Next, assume PP, and let ψ and ϑ be arbitrary well-formed formulas. By PP,
(((ψ ∨ (ψ → ϑ))→ ϑ)→ ψ ∨ (ψ→ ϑ))→ ψ ∨ (ψ → ϑ).
We show that the antecedent (and hence, by modus ponens, the consequent) of this holds. So
assume (ψ ∨ (ψ → ϑ))→ ϑ). Furthermore assume ψ. Then ϑ, so (discharging the assumption
ψ) we have ψ → ϑ. This weakens to ψ ∨ (ψ → ϑ), so 13 follows.
Last, since → weakens, clearly 13 implies 1.
(b) First, we show DGP ⇔ 7. Assume that (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϑ. Now if DGP holds then either ϕ→ ψ or
ψ → ϕ. In the first case, if ϕ holds, then also ϕ ∧ ψ, and hence ϑ holds. Together that means
that in the first case we have ϕ → ϑ. Similarly, in the second case ψ → ϑ. Conversely, apply 7
to ϑ ≡ ϕ ∧ ψ. Then the antecedent is ⊤, and so (ϕ → (ϕ ∧ ψ)) ∨ (ψ → (ϕ ∧ ψ)). Hence the
desired (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ) holds.
Next, we show DGP ⇔ 8. Assume that (ϕ → ϑ) ∧ (ψ → β). By DGP either ϕ → β and we
are done, or β → ϕ. But in that second case if we assume ψ also β holds, which in turn implies
ϕ, which in turn implies ϑ. Together, in the second case, ψ → ϑ. Conversely, apply 8 to ϑ ≡ ϕ
and β ≡ ψ, which yields
((ϕ→ ϕ) ∧ (ψ → ψ))→ ((ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ)) .
Since the antecedent is (⊤∧ ⊤) ≡ ⊤, we get the desired (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ).
Last, DGP ⇔ 15. For the forward direction, suppose that ϕ → ψ ∨ ϑ. DGP gives (ψ →
ϑ)∨ (ϑ→ ψ). In the first case, assuming ϕ, we get ψ ∨ ϑ, which (by modus ponens on ψ → ϑ)
is ϑ in this case. So ϕ→ ϑ, which weakens to (ϕ→ ψ)∨(ϕ→ ϑ). In the second case, a similar
argument also shows (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ϕ → ϑ). Either way the consequent of 15 holds; whence, by
the deduction theorem, 15. Conversely, apply 15 to ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ, and ψ to get:
(ϕ ∨ ψ → ϕ ∨ ψ)→ ((ϕ ∨ ψ → ϕ) ∨ (ϕ ∨ ψ → ψ)) .
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Now clearly the antecedent is always satisfied. So we have that
(ϕ ∨ ψ → ϕ) ∨ (ϕ ∨ ψ → ψ) ,
which is equivalent to the desired (ψ → ϕ) ∨ (ϕ→ ψ).
We are now in a position to lay out how these principles fit together.
Proposition 3. The implications in Figure 1 hold:
DNE
PP EFQ
DGPLEM
WLEM
WT
DGP→
Figure 1: Some principles distinguishable over minimal logic. As is shown in Section 5, none of the
arrows can be reversed and no arrow can be added.
That DNE ⇒ EFQ and LEM ⇒ WLEM is clear; we prove the remaining implications.
Proof. • DNE ⇒ PP: Assume (ϕ→ ψ)→ ϕ, and ¬ϕ. Modus tollens gives ¬(ϕ→ ψ) whence,
by counterexample (9) (see Proposition 1), ϕ ∧ ¬ψ; so ϕ. With ¬ϕ, this gives ⊥; and hence
(discharging the assumption ¬ϕ) ¬¬ϕ. Appying DNE gives ϕ.
• PP ⇒ LEM: Assume ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ); that is, (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) → ⊥. Then ϕ leads to a contradiction; so
¬ϕ. But then ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. So we have ((ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)→ ⊥)→ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ). Applying PP, ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
• PP ⇒ DGP: By PP,
((((ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ))→ ϕ)→ ((ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ)))→ ((ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ)) .
We show that the antecedent holds. Assume
((ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ))→ ϕ, (3)
and suppose ψ. Then ϕ → ψ, so by (3), ϕ. Thus (discharging the assumption of ψ), ψ → ϕ.
But then again by (3), ϕ, which weakens to (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ) and we are done.
• DGP ⇒ WLEM: By DGP, we have (ϕ → ¬ϕ) ∨ (¬ϕ → ϕ). In the former case, assuming ϕ
gives ⊥, whence ¬ϕ. In the latter case, assuming ¬ϕ gives ⊥, whence ¬¬ϕ.
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4 The implicational fragment
For various technical reasons it is often interesting to work only with formulas built up from proposi-
tional symbols including ⊥ with →. Of course, we still use ¬ as an abbreviation for → ⊥. Assuming
classical logic (DNE) this is no restriction, since there ∨ and ∧ are definable from → and ¬. More
precisely we can define ϕ∨ψ as ¬ϕ→ ψ, but over minimal logic this validates EFQ.9 A more faithful
(but slightly weaker) translation is:
ϕ ∨ ψ := (ϕ→ ⊥)→ (ψ → ⊥)→ ⊥ [≡ ¬ϕ→ ¬¬ψ] . (4)
Notice that we might also translate ϕ ∨ ψ as ¬ψ → ¬¬ϕ, whose equivalence to (4) is minimally
provable; we will use whichever of the two translations is more expedient. Moreover, conjunction can
be removed entirely also: ϕ ∧ ψ → ϑ translates to ϕ → ψ → ϑ,10 and ϑ → ϕ ∧ ψ translates to the
two separate cases ϑ → ϕ and ϑ → ψ.11 Translates of formulas are then defined in the obvious way.
We denote the translation of a formula ϕ into the implication-only fragment by ϕ→.
The following are of special note:
• 13, a strong form of linearity, which (by Proposition 2 is equivalent to DNE. Its translation into
implicative form is:
¬ψ → ¬¬(ψ → ϑ) , (Weak Tarski’s Formula, WT)
which is an abbreviation for (ψ → ⊥)→ ((ψ → ϑ)→ ⊥)→ ⊥.
• 11, Dirk Gently’s Principle, which translates to:
¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ ¬¬(ψ → ϕ). (Implicative Dirk Gently’s Principle, DGP→)
The above principles are closely related, but distinct. A separation result can be found in Section 5.
Proposition 4. The following implications hold:
(a) PP ⇒ WT
(b) DGP ⇒ DGP→
(c) EFQ ⇒ WT
(d) WT ⇒ DGP→
Proof. (a) We use PP in the form ((⊥ → ϑ) → ⊥) → ⊥. For modus ponens we need to establish
that (⊥ → ϑ) → ⊥. For the purpose of applying the deduction theorem to show this (and also
WT), assume:
(i) ψ → ⊥;
(ii) (ψ → ϑ)→ ⊥; and
(iii) ⊥ → ϑ.
Then by transitivity on (i) and (iii), ψ → ϑ. Using (ii), ⊥. The deduction theorem (discharging
(iii)) yields (⊥ → ϑ) → ⊥. Applying PP gives ⊥, whence (discharging (ii) in another applica-
tion of the deduction theorem) ((ψ → ϑ) → ⊥) → ⊥. The conclusion follows by yet another
application of the deduction theorem.
(b) Assume that ¬(ϕ→ ψ). By DGP either ϕ→ ψ or ψ → ϕ. In the first case we get ⊥ by modus
ponens, and therefore also ¬¬(ψ → ϕ). In the second case, since minimally α → ¬¬α, also
¬¬(ψ → ϕ). Thus in both cases the conclusion holds.
9Simply use ∨-introduction and the proposed translation; EFQ follows. To translate ϕ ∨ ψ as ¬ϕ → ψ would therefore be
disingenuous.
10Note that negated conjunction is a special case.
11It is not clear, however, that this makes no difference in proofs; more on this later.
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(c) The proof is similar to (a), but simpler, since (iii) is now no longer an assumption but an instance
of EFQ (and so we do not need to explicitly apply PP).
(d) Assume that ¬(ϕ → ψ). Then, assuming ψ and weakening leads to a contradiction; so ¬ψ. By
WT, ¬¬(ψ → ϕ). The conclusion follows from the deduction theorem.
In Section 5 we show that these implications are strict. For the paradoxes of material implication,
using the translation (4) (and the comments following it), we have:
• LEM→ is ¬ϕ→ ¬¬¬ϕ, which is provable in minimal logic. Similarly, WLEM→ is provable.
• 1→ is ¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ ¬¬(ψ → ϑ).
• 2→ is ϕ→ ¬ϕ→ ψ.
• 3→ is ϕ→ ¬ψ → ¬¬¬ψ, a weakening of double negation introduction and hence provable.
• 4→ is ¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ ¬¬¬ψ, and is provable.
• 7→ is (ϕ→ ψ → ϑ)→ ¬(ϕ→ ϑ)→ ¬¬(ψ → ϑ).
• 8→ is (ϕ→ ϑ)→ (ψ → β)→ ¬(ϕ→ β)→ ¬¬(ψ → ϑ).
• 9→ is (a) ¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ ϕ and (b) ¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ ¬ψ. The latter is provable.
• 11→ is DGP→.
• 12→ is (¬¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬ϕ)→ ϕ.
• 13→ is WT.
• 14→ is ¬(¬ϕ → ¬ψ) → ¬¬(¬ψ → ¬ϕ). This is provable: assume ¬(¬ϕ → ¬ψ) and ¬ψ.
Weakening gives ¬ϕ → ¬ψ, a contradiction; whence ¬ϕ. So ¬ψ → ¬ϕ, which by double
negation introduction gives the conclusion.
• 15→ is (ϕ→ ¬ψ → ¬¬ϑ)→ ¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ ¬¬(ϕ→ ϑ).
• DM1→ is (ϕ→ ¬ψ)↔ (¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬¬ψ), which is provable.
• DM2→ is ¬(¬ϕ→ ¬¬ψ)→ ¬ϕ, ¬(¬ϕ→ ¬¬ψ)→ ¬ψ, and ¬ϕ→ ¬ψ → ¬(¬ϕ→ ¬¬ψ),
each of which is provable.
• DM1′→ is (¬ϕ→ ¬¬ψ)↔ (¬ϕ→ ¬¬ψ), which is ⊤ (always satisfied).
• DM2′→ is (a) ¬(¬¬ϕ → ¬¬¬ψ) → ϕ, (b) ¬(¬¬ϕ → ¬¬¬ψ) → ψ, and (c) ϕ → ψ →
¬(¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬¬ψ). The latter, (c), is provable.
It is often technically useful to know when an operator may be pulled back through an implication, so
two further sentences of interest are:
17. (ϕ→ ¬¬ψ)→ ¬¬(ϕ→ ψ).
18. ¬¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ (¬¬ϕ→ ψ).
Note:
• The converse of 17 is provable. For, assume ¬¬(ϕ→ ψ). Further assume
(i) ϕ;
(ii) ¬ψ; and
(iii) ϕ→ ψ.
(i) and (iii) lead to ⊥; whence (discharging (iii)) ¬(ϕ → ψ). But then ⊥ again, so (discharging
(ii)) ¬¬ψ. Applying the deduction theorem twice gives the converse of 17.
• Likewise, the converse of 18 is provable. Assume ¬¬ϕ→ ψ and ϕ. Then ¬¬ϕ, so ψ and hence,
in fact, ϕ→ ψ, which is stronger than the converse of 18.
We now turn to classifying the foregoing sentences, whenever they are not provable in minimal logic
alone.
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Proposition 5. The following are equivalent:
(a) DNE, 9→(a), 12→, DM2′→(a), DM2′→(b), 18.
(b) EFQ, 2→.
(c) WT, 1→, 15→, 17.
Proof. (a) Since full classical logic is obtained by adding DNE to minimal logic, it suffices to prove
that each numbered principle implies DNE.
Observe that DNE is a special case of 9→(a)—namely, the case where ψ = ⊥.
To see that 12→ ⇒ DNE, assume ¬¬ϕ. By weakening, ¬¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬ϕ, and so by 12→, ϕ.
To see that DM2′→(a), DM2′→(b) each imply DNE, substitute ϕ for ψ; then, assuming ¬¬ϕ, in
each case the antecedent is satisfied, and in each case the consequent is ϕ.
To see that 18 implies DNE, substitute ϕ := ψ; then the antecedent of 18 is always satisfied, and
the consequent is DNE.
(b) It is clear that EFQ ⇒ 2→. For the converse, suppose we wish to show that ⊥ → ϑ. Assume ⊥.
Then (weakening) ¬⊤. In particular, substituting ⊤ for ϕ and ϑ for ψ in 2→ gives
⊤ → ¬⊤ → ϑ.
Two applications of modus ponens followed by the deduction theorem gives the desired conclu-
sion.
(c) Since ¬(ϕ → ψ) → ¬ψ is provable, transitivity with WT shows that WT ⇒ 1→. Conversely,
suppose that ¬ψ, and ¬(ψ → ϑ). In view of the deduction theorem, we aim to derive ⊥.
Consider the following form of 1→:
¬(¬ψ → ψ)→ ¬¬(ψ → ϑ).
Using the assumption¬(ψ → ϑ), by the provable version of contraposition we conclude ¬¬(¬ψ →
ψ). Since the converse of 17 is provable, ¬ψ → ¬¬ψ. But then, using the assumption ¬ψ, ¬¬ψ,
which gives ⊥ and we are done.
To see that WT→ ⇒ 15→, assume:
(i) ϕ→ (¬ψ → ¬¬ϑ);
(ii) ¬(ϕ→ ψ); and
(iii) ¬(ϕ→ ϑ).T
In light of the deduction theorem, it is enough to prove ⊥. Suppose ϕ. Using (i) now yields
¬ψ → ¬¬ϑ. From (ii) we see ¬ψ; whence ¬¬ϑ. But from (iii), ¬ϑ, a contradiction. Therefore,
¬ϕ. Applying WT, ¬¬(ϕ→ ψ), which contradicts (ii). Hence ⊥, and we are done.
Conversely, suppose that ¬ψ and (for the purpose of deriving a contradiction) ¬(ψ → ϑ). Sup-
pose that ψ. Then ⊥, so that ¬¬ϑ, which weakens to ¬ϑ → ¬¬ϑ. Discharging the assumption,
ψ → ¬ϑ→ ¬¬ϑ. Then invoke 15→ in the form
(ψ → ¬ϑ→ ¬¬ϑ)→ (¬(ψ → ϑ)→ ¬¬(ψ → ϑ))
and detach twice (using the assumptions still in play) to get ¬¬(ψ → ϑ). This contradicts the
assumption, so ⊥. Hence WT.12
To see that WT→ ⇒ 17, suppose that ϕ→ ¬¬ψ, and (for contradiction) that ¬(ϕ→ ψ). From
the latter, ¬ψ; whence, using the former, ¬ϕ. Applying WT, ¬¬(ϕ→ ψ), which contradicts the
assumption; so ⊥.
Conversely, suppose that ¬ψ. Assuming ψ, we get ⊥, so we may conclude ¬¬ϑ and therefore
ψ → ¬¬ϑ. Applying 17, ¬¬(ψ → ϑ) and we are done.
12It may be interesting to note that at least one instance of contraction is used in this proof.
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Proposition 6. The following implications hold:
(a) WT ⇒ 7→;
(b) DGP→ ⇔ 8→;
(c) 7→ ⇒ DGP→ (using ∧).
Proof. (a) Assume that ϕ → ψ → ϑ. By interderivability of ¬α → ¬¬β and ¬β → ¬¬α, and in
view of the deduction theorem, we may show that
¬(ψ → ϑ)→ ¬¬(ϕ→ ϑ).13
Assume the antecedent. Transitivity over the assumptions gives ¬ϕ. Applying WT, ¬¬(ϕ→ ϑ)
and we are done.
(b) First consider ϕ, ψ, ϑ, and β such that ϕ → ϑ, ψ → β, and ¬ϕ → β. We want to show that
¬¬(ψ → ϑ). By DGP→ it is enough to show ¬(ϑ → ψ). So assume also ϑ → ψ, which
together with the above assumption implies ϕ → β, but that contradicts the third of the initial
assumptions. Thus we can derive ⊥ and are done.
Conversely, a special case of 8→ is
(ϕ→ ϕ)→ (ψ → ψ)→ ¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ ¬¬(ψ → ϕ) .
Since the first to assumptions are tautologies we have
¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ ¬¬(ψ → ϕ) ,
which is DGP→.
(c) Let ϕ and ψ be such that ¬(ϕ→ ψ) and ¬(ψ → ϕ). Notice that then also ¬(ϕ → ϕ ∧ ψ) and
¬(ψ → ϕ ∧ ψ). We want to derive at a contradiction.
Applying 7→ to ϕ, ψ, and ϕ ∧ ψ gives us
(ϕ→ (ψ → (ϕ ∧ ψ)))→ ¬(ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ψ))→ ¬¬(ψ → (ϕ ∧ ψ)) .
Notice that the antecedent is provable minimally, so we have
¬(ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ψ))→ ¬(ψ → (ϕ ∧ ψ))→ ⊥ ,
and therefore, applying this to out assumptions we get the desired ⊥.
We will comment on the strange status of statement 7→ in the last section.
5 Separation results (semantics)
To show the strictness of the implications summed up in Figure 1 we will use models rather than proof
theoretic methods, which is the route taken in [14]. We base our semantics for minimal logic on the one
described in [9]. More precisely, we consider (W,⊑, Q) where (W,⊑) is a partial order and Q ⊆ W
is a cone—that is, an upwards closed set. A valuation v is a monotone mapping fromW toP (PROP).
We will call the elements of W worlds.
A model is a pair (W, v) and the forcing relation between a model and a formula is defined in
almost the same way as for Kripke semantics. That is we set
u  P ⇐⇒ P ∈ v(u)
13Substitute ϕ→ ϑ for α, and ψ → ϑ for β
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for propositional formulas and then inductively
u  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ u  ϕ and u  ψ
u  ϕ ∨ ψ ⇐⇒ u  ϕ or u  ψ
u  ϕ→ ψ ⇐⇒ ∀y ∈ W : (u ⊑ y ∧ y  ϕ =⇒ y  ψ) .
A point of difference with the usual Kripke semantics is that we do not assume that ⊥ is never forced,
but that we have
u  ⊥ ⇐⇒ u ∈ Q .
The intuition behind Kripke style semantics is that we have a multitude of possible worlds ordered by
⊑with the requirement that if a formula is true in some world it is also true in worlds “above” it relative
to the order. Each world by itself behaves like a classical model—of course, apart from our treatment
of ⊥. We will call worlds u such that u ∈ Q abnormal, and the otherwise normal. Since we have
defined ¬ϕ as ϕ→ ⊥,14 we get
u  ¬ϕ⇐⇒ ∀y ∈ W : (u ⊑ y ∧ y  ϕ =⇒ y ∈ Q) ,
that is ¬ϕ holds in some world if the only worlds above in which ϕ holds are abnormal ones.
We write (W, v)  ϕ or simply W  ϕ, if ϕ is forced in all worlds of W . As usual, the valuation
v should be clear from the context and will not be mentioned. There is another reason why v for us
is actually irrelevant: in the present paper, we only consider full models. That is, we assume that for
every upward closed set U ⊆ W there exists a propositional symbol PU such u  PU ⇔ u ∈ U . This
excludes many pathological cases of considering complicated structures with trivial valuations. It also
means that for any well formed formula α there exists a propositional symbol Pα such that
W  α⇐⇒W  Pα ,
which has the advantage, that we only need to consider our axiom schemes to range over propositional
symbols and not arbitrary formulas.
Having an arbitrary partial order as our underlying structure is different from [7, 16] which uses
tree like-orders—or to be precise finitely branching trees. There is a subtle difference between the two
notions as we will explain. On first glance the differences seem minuscule:
Proposition 7. Assume that (W, v) is a model that is tame in the sense that if L is a maximal chain
with maximal element u, and u ⊑ v, then there exists some maximal chain L′ having v as a maximal
element and L ⊂ L′.15
Then there exists a tree-like model (Wt, vt) such that
W  α↔Wt  α (5)
for any formula α. Furthermore, if (W, v) is finite (i.e. W is finite as a set) then Wt is a finite and
finitely branching tree.
Proof. Define Wt to be
{ (u,L) ∈ W × P(W) |L is a maximal chain with u as a maximal element } ,
and set
(u, L) ⊑ (v, L′)⇐⇒ L ⊂ L′ .
Notice that if (u, L) ⊑ (v, L′) then u ∈ L′ and that, in particular, u ⊑ v. As our new valuation set
vt(u,L) = v(u).
14This is a point of departure for many other non-classical logics, such as relevant logics, logics of formal inconsistency, and the
like. As mentioned, this is a preliminary investigation into the realm of non-classical reverse mathematics more generally; so we
stick fairly close to the usual, classical, interpretation of negation.
15This holds if, for example,W is finite, or one assumes Zorn’s Lemma.
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Figure 2: The construction of this proposition removes any joins.
We will proof that for any formula α for all (u,L) ∈ Wt
(u, L)  α⇐⇒ u  α (6)
by induction on the formula α. If α is a propositional symbol (including ⊥) then we have 6 by our
definition of vt. The connectives ∧ and ∨ are straightforward to deal with. So let α ≡ β → γ.
For the direction “⇐=” fix (u,L) ∈ Wt and assume that u  β → γ. Now consider (v, L′) such
that (u,L) ⊑ (v, L′) and that (v, L′)  β. By our induction hypothesis that means v  β, which
implies that v  γ. Using the induction hypothesis again we get the desired (v, L′)  γ.
For the direction “=⇒” assume that (u, L)  β → γ, and that v is such that u ⊑ v and v  β. The
only really non-trivial step in this entire proof is to use the tame-ness assumption to find L′ which has
v as a maximal element and is such that L ⊆ L′. Then (u,L) ⊑ (v, L′). By our induction hypothesis
we have that (v, L′)  β, which means that (v, L′)  γ. Using our induction hypothesis yet again this
means that v  γ and we are done.
The differences between tree-like and non-tree-like models stem from our definition of a full model.
Notice that even if W is full Wt might not be. In the example sketched in Figure 2, in Wt there is no
proposition that is forced at one of the top nodes, but not the other; all propositions are either forced at
both top-nodes at the same time or not forced at both nodes.
If one does prefer to work with tree-like models one cannot restrict to fullness. For example, as
one can easily see, any intuitionistic (i.e. Q = ∅) tree-like model containing a branching, i.e. that is
not v-free, does not satisfy WLEM, which means that intuitionistic tree-like models cannot distinguish
between WLEM and DGP.16 So for a structural analysis of what principles hold depending on the
underlying partial order it makes more sense to consider arbitrary partial orders rather than tree-like
ones. This also excludes Veldman’s explosive nodes [13], which do not add further distinctions here.
It is straightforward to see that we have soundness [9, Proposition 2.3.2], which means we can use
these models to show the underivability of formulas in minimal logic. Models for intuitionistic logic,
that is minimal logic together with EFQ, are exactly the ones where ⊥ is never forced (in this case we
recover the usual Kripke semantics):
Proposition 8. W  EFQ if and only if Q = ∅.
Proof. Clearly, if Q = ∅ then W  EFQ. Conversely, if there is an abnormal world u ∈ Q, then by
fullness we can consider the propositional symbol P∅ for which u  ⊥, but u 1 P∅; i.e. u 1 ⊥ →
P∅.
Given a structure (W,⊑, Q) we define its loBOTomyW⊥ to be (W,⊑,W), that is we are making
all worlds are abnormal. Even this quite trivial construction has very useful consequences for us.
Proposition 9. For any (full) model we have
1. W⊥  LEM
2. W⊥ 1 DNE
3. W⊥ 1 EFQ
16Nor can they distinguish between DNE, LEM, and PP (see Proposition 12), but these are all known to be intuitionistically
equivalent anyway; see Sec. 6.
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Proof. The proofs are easy after one notices that W⊥  ¬α for any formula α. It is also worth
pointing out that we need the fullness assumption for the second and third part to ensure that there is a
propositional symbol P such that W 1 P and therefore W⊥ 1 P .
Proposition 10. Let W, v be any full model, and let α be a formula not containing ⊥. Then
W  α⇐⇒W⊥  α
Proof. Induction on the complexity of formulas.
We say that a partial order is v-free if it doesn’t contain a, b, c such a 6 b, a 6 c, and b and c
incomparable.
Proposition 11. Let (W,⊑, Q) be a structure.
1. W  DGP if and only ifW is v-free.
2. W  WLEM if W \Q is v-free.17
Proof. 1. AssumeW is v-free and letP andQ be arbitrary propositional symbols. Consider an arbi-
trary world u ∈ W . If P ∈ v(u) we have that u  Q→ P . Similarly if Q ∈ v(u) we have that
u  P → Q. In both cases u  P → Q ∨Q → P . So assume that neither P,Q ∈ v(u). Now
consider the sets A = { y ∈ W |u ⊑ y ∧ P ∈ v(y) } and B = { y ∈ W |u ⊑ y ∧Q ∈ v(y) }.
We must have that eitherA ⊂ B or B ⊂ A: for assume there were z, z′ such that z ∈ A, z /∈ B,
z′ ∈ B, and z′ /∈ A. We must have that z 6⊑ z′, since z ⊑ z′ implies that z′ ∈ B. Similarly
z′ 6⊑ z, but then u, z, z′ contradict the assumption that W is v-free. If A ⊂ B we have that for
every u  Q → P , and if B ⊂ A we get u  P → Q. In both cases u  P → Q ∨Q → P .
Hence we have shown W  DGP.
Conversely we will show that ifW is not v-free thenW 1 DGP. So assume there is a, b, c ∈ W
such that a ⊑ b, a ⊑ c, but neither b ⊑ c nor c ⊑ b. Let Pb↑ and Pc↑ be the propositional
symbols corresponding to the upwards closed sets {x ∈ W : b ⊑ x} and {x ∈ W : c ⊑ x},
respectively. Notice that b  Pb↑ , b 1 Pc↑ , c  Pc↑ , and c 1 Pb↑ . Assume a  (Pb↑ →
Pc↑)∨ (Pc↑ → Pb↑ ). Then either a  (Pb↑ → Pc↑) or a  (Pc↑ → Pb↑); w.l.o.g. the first case.
Then by monotonicity b  (Pb↑ → Pc↑). Since also b  Pb↑ we have b  Pc↑ ; a contradiction.
2. Assume W \ Q is v-free and let P be an arbitrary propositional symbol. Consider an arbitrary
world u ∈ W . If u ∈ Q we have u  ¬α for any α, so we may assume that u ∈ W \Q. If there
is no u ⊑ y such that P ∈ v(y) and y /∈ Q then u  ¬P . So assume that there is u ⊑ y such
that y /∈ Q and P ∈ v(y). We want to show that u  ¬¬P . To do this we will show that for any
u ⊑ z if z  ¬P then z ∈ Q. So assume that u ⊑ z, and z /∈ Q. Because W \Q was assumed
to be v-free we either have z ⊑ y or y ⊑ z. In the second case, by monotonicity, we get z  P
and therefore z  ⊥; a contradiction. In the first case, similarly, by monotonicity v  ¬P and
therefore y  ⊥; again a contradiction. So z ∈ Q. Hence we are done, since either u  ¬P or
u  ¬¬P , so together u  ¬P ∨ ¬¬P .
Proposition 12. Let (W,⊑, Q) be a structure.
1. W  PP if and only if W consists of pair-wise incomparable points.
2. W  LEM if and only ifW \Q consists of pair-wise incomparable points.
3. W  DNE if and only ifW consists of pair-wise incomparable points and Q = ∅.
Proof. 1. Assume that W consists of pair-wise incomparable points, let P, S be arbitrary proposi-
tional symbols, and consider an arbitrary world u ∈ W . If S ∈ v(u) we have that u  ((S →
P ) → S) → S. If S /∈ v(u) we have that u  (S → P ), and therefore u 1 ((S → P ) → S).
Hence also in that case u  ((S → P )→ S)→ S.
17The converse does not hold. See the modelW4 in Section 6.
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Conversely assume that there are distinct u, y ∈ W with u ⊑ y. Now let U = {u ⊑ y |u 6= y },
and consider PU as above, and let S = P∅. Then for every u ⊑ y with u 6= y we have
y  (PU → S) → PU . For u we have that u 1 PU → S (since y 1 PU → S) and hence
u  (PU → S) → PU . Now, if u  PP we would also have that u  PU ; a contradiction. So
we have shown that ifW contains two comparable worlds then PP does not hold, or equivalently
that if PP holds then W does not contain comparable worlds.
2. Assume thatW\Q consists of pair-wise incomparable points, let P be an arbitrary propositional
symbol, and consider an arbitrary world u ∈ W . Now either P ∈ v(u) and therefore u  P or
P /∈ v(u). Since the only worlds above u ⊑ y, u 6= y are such that y ∈ Q and therefore y  ⊥
we have that for all u ⊑ y with y  P also y  ⊥. Hence in that case u  ¬P .
Conversely assume that there are distinct u, y ∈ W\Qwith u ⊑ y. Consider Py↑ as above. Then
u 1 Py↑ . But also u 1 ¬Py↑ , since if u  ¬Py↑ also y  ¬Py↑ which would imply y  ⊥; a
contradiction to y /∈ Q. Hence u 1 LEM. Equivalently we have shown that if W  LEM then
W \Q cannot contain two comparable worlds.
3. This follows from Proposition 8 together with either of the previous two items and Proposition
13 further down.
To start with one of the most trivial models imaginable, consider W1 = {0} and v1(0) = ∅. That
is there is only one world. By Proposition 9 this means that
LEM 6=⇒ DNE
and
LEM 6=⇒ EFQ .
The second structure we are considering is W2 = ({1, 2} ,6, ∅). Since Q = ∅ this is a model of
EFQ. It does not, however, force DNE, since, if P is such that JP K = {2} then no node forces ¬P ,
whence W2  ¬¬P . However, of course, 1 1 P . The same P also ensures thatW2 1 LEM. A useful
variant of W2 is W ′2 = ({1, 2} ,6, {2}); in that case, with JP K = {2} again, DGP→ is forced since
it is v-free; however, WT is not forced. To see this, note that since ⊥ is forced whenever P is forced,
1  ¬P . However, since P → S is nowhere forced, 1  ¬(P → S). Since 1 1 ⊥, 1 1 ¬¬(P → S).
HenceW ′3 1 WT. Note that LEM,DGP, and WLEM are also forced in this model, separating WT and
DGP→ from these principles.
The third structure (W3, ∅) is a simple v shape, so, for example, ({∅, {1}, {2}},⊂, ∅). W3 does
not satisfy WLEM, since for P = P{1} we have that ∅ 1 ¬P ∨ ¬¬P . Like W2, a useful variant
is W ′3 = ({∅, {1}, {2}},⊂, {{1}, {2}}). This model does not force DGP→. To see this, assign
P = P{1}, S = S{2}. Then since ∅ 1 P → S and ∅ 1 S → P , and since both {1}  ⊥ and
{2}  ⊥, ∅  ¬(S → P ) and ∅  ¬(P → S). But since ∅ 1 ⊥, we have ∅ 1 ¬¬(P → S). Hence
W ′3 1 DGP→.
Figure 3 includes the Hasse diagrams of the underlying orders of these models.
(a)W1 (b)W2 (c)W3 (d)W4
Figure 3: The Hasse diagrams of the underlying orders of our models
These models, together with their ⊥ versions and useful variants (and W4; see the next section),
show that all the implications in Figure 1 are strict. These models also show that—apart from the
transitive closure—no arrows can be added to Figure 1. For simplicity we include a table. Further,
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DNE EFQ LEM DGP PP WLEM WT DGP→
W1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
W⊥
1
✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
W2 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
W⊥
2
✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
W
′
2 ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓
W3 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
W
⊥
3 ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
W ′
3
✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗
W4 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
W⊥
4
✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
Figure 4: An overview, over all models over minimal logic. See next section for W4.
note that since every principle fails to be enforced in at least one of the models, none of the principles
outlined are provable in minimal logic alone.
6 The intuitionistic case
It is well known that:
Proposition 13. LEM and EFQ imply DNE
Proof. Let ϕ be such that ¬¬ϕ holds. Thus if we have ¬ϕ then ⊥, which by EFQ implies ϕ. Together
with LEM that means that ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ implies ϕ.
Thus under the assumption of EFQ our hierarchy collapses to the following simple one:
DNE, PP, LEM
DGP
WLEM
The model W2 shows that the first of these implications is strict, however none of the models
considered so far satisfy EFQ and WLEM, but not DGP. To do so we consider the diamond-shaped
structure ({∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}},⊂, ∅). As Q = ∅ this is a model of EFQ. As W4 is not v-free it does
not satisfy DGP (Proposition 11).
Finally we need to check that WLEM holds. So let P be an arbitrary propositional symbol. If
P /∈ v({1, 2}) then W4  P → ⊥, since P is never forced. If P ∈ v({1, 2}) then P → ⊥ is never
forced in any world, so W4  ¬¬P vacuously. In both cases W4  ¬P ∨ ¬¬P .
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7 Open Questions and Concluding Remarks
7.1 Statement 7→
As shown in Section 4 we have
WT =⇒ 7→ =⇒ DGP→ .
One can check that 7→ holds in exactly the models discussed which validate DGP→, so it is provably
weaker than WT and one would naturally conjecture that it is equivalent to that statement. However
we could not find a proof of DGP→ ⇒ 7→. It is also interesting that we could not find a proof of the
converse that does not rely on ∧.
7.2 Kreisel Putnam and Scott logic
In the fabulously titled (even for German speakers) paper [8] it is shown that the formula
(¬ϕ→ ψ ∨ ϑ)→ (¬ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (¬ϕ→ ϑ) (KP)
is not derivable in intuitionistic logic. One can check that it holds in exactly the same of the models
discussed as DGP→. It is completely unclear, though, whether either one implies the other. In the same
paper [8] also the following formula, which is not derivable intuitionistically, and which is due to Dana
Scott is mentioned
((¬¬ϕ→ ϕ)→ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ))→ (¬¬ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ).
This formula is clearly implied by WLEM. It is, however, weaker, since it actually holds in all models
we have considered in this paper. It would also be interesting to have intuitionistic models (i.e. ones
validating EFQ) rejecting these principles.
7.3 SmL
It is also worth mentioning another important formula characterising an superintuitionistic logic, the
so called Smetanich’s logic [15]. It is obtained by adding the following axiom scheme to intuitionistic
logic.
(¬ψ → ϕ)→ (((ϕ→ ψ)→ ϕ)→ ϕ) . (SmL)
It is easily seen that this is implied by LEM. It also implies WLEM which we can see if we apply it to
¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ and ¬ϕ. However we can check that it holds inW2 and does not hold in W ′3 which means
that it neither implies LEM nor is it implied by or implies DGP (and therefore neither by WLEM). That
means we have the following extension to the left bottom corner of Figure 1.
LEM DGP
SmL
WLEM
Figure 5: A small extension in the lower left corner of Figure 1.
It is not clear, however, how SmL relates to DGP intuitionistically. One can see that DGP does not
imply SmL even under the assumption of EFQ, since the former holds in the model (W5, ∅,6), where
W5 = ({1, 2, 3}) and 6 is the usual order.
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7.4 Concluding Remarks
The distinctions and equivalences in this paper represent, of course, only the tip of the proverbial
iceberg. Beyond what can be distinguished in other non-classical logics, of special mention are sub-
structural logics [10]. The proofs presented here assume all the usual structural rules. An analysis
of which proofs still go through in the various substructural logics will clearly shed further light on
computational aspects.
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